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Something Is In The Air
Let me begin with two scenarios, serving perhaps as thought-experiments that introduce some of
the issues I wish to raise today.
First scene:
It is late at night in Cambridge, Massachussetts some time in the mid 80's. Chris Langton,
who will soon organize the first conference on Artificial Life, is playing with a cellular automata
program called the Game ofLife. Bored with waiting for a long configuration to run, Langton
looks out the window at the twinkling lights on the Charles River. Then, he says, "'Suddenly I got
the sense that I wasnt alone. A completely visceral feeling, hairs standing on the back ofmy
neck.'" Langston says that bis experience "went very deep"; it '''got caught up in the idea of
information having a life ofits own, a living logic. It's irrelevant whether you'd say it's alive, but
it's a similar class ofphenomena'" (Lewin 98-99). '''[I] had the feeling there was something very
deep here in this little artificial universe and its evolution through time'" (Levy,95).
The other scenario unfolds in the mind ofJoel de Rosnay, a biochemist and information scientist
and administrator at la Cite des sciences et de l'industrie de Ia Villette in Paris. He begins his book
Le Cerveau Planetaire with the proclamation that:
We are the neurons ofthe earth: the cells ofa brain in the process offorming on a
planetary scale.... Today, satellite communication networks or those ofpersonal
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computers figure among the first circuits ofthe nervous system of society. People
who participate in the creation ofthese networks or who use them regularly, have
the feeling ofbeing the cells ofnew sensory organs with which the planet is
endowed. (de Rosnay, 11-12)
These scenarios depict moments ofwhat in contemporary parlance has come to be called
"emergence." Emergence is a rather ubiquitous term: one speaks ofthe "emergence" ofnew
literatures, political factions, diasporic cultures, virtual communities or viruses. The essential
concept ofemergence is relatively straightforward: the whole is more than the sum ofits parts, or,
a whole of some kind emerges from the interactions ofparts, a whole that can maintain itselfor
reproduce or evolve. But these days a more functional, perhaps machinic description of emergence
is favored: there is a system made up ofcertain components, which are connected in particular
ways; they begin interacting in ways constrained by mIes ofexchange prescribed by the nature of
components and the type of system. From these interactions a tangled web of connections among
the components emerges. At some critical point, the system crosses a threshold where its
interconnectedness overruns or supereedes the individual components, and the interconnectedness
gives rise to an "emergent property" or constitutes an "emergent behavior" in itself Often this
threshold ofemergence also marks the appearance of a self-sustaining or self-replicating system.
This model of"emergence" may be seen as holism in a different guise: the whole becomes,
through the relations between its components and the resulting organizational morphology, more
than the sum ofits parts. Holism is nothing new--and neither, for that matter, is emergence, both
notions playing prominent roles in Kantian organicism or Bergsonian vitalism, for example. But,
largely through the influence ofthe technosciences, the contemporary form of emergence is
distinguished from its predecessors by the materialist account it is given. In a philosophical sense,
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this materialism stands opposed to essentialism; no apriori force such as elan vital is posited. In a,
well, material sense, this materialism is quantitative and machinc; it is rooted in mathematics, and
staged in and by the computer. Systemic properties emerge without a central processor or
controlling agent. Local mIes give rise to global coherence through "self-organization," a process
intrinsie to "the dynamies of the system itself." Complexity theorist Stuart Kauffinan sums up tlle
contemporary mindset when he places self-organization and emergence in the service of an
"unrepetant holism, born not ofmysticism, but ofmathematical necessity" (Home, 69).
Something is in the Air--Or Is It?
I begin with these scenes and descriptions of emergence because they seem to crystallize
several aspects of a larger sense we all have--don't we?--that we are in the middle of some major
bend in the evolutionary river. Emergence provides a trope for an encompassing transformation in
the human: a potential crossing of an evolutionary threshold, an historical moment when the human
species may be in the process of 'morphing. ' Whether implicitly or explicitly, a sense of
emergence--a feeling that something weird and new is emerging out of collisions and connections
between known things--propels interest in areas ranging from postcolonial cultural identities and
diasporic social formations to hiotechnological production ofnew moleeules and virtual
communities in world-wide webs of communication. In all these domains, there is the sense that
familiar houndaries and classifications are breaking down (life versus information), that previously
relatively stahle spatial and temporal patterns are undergoing radical reconfigurations (historical
traditions and the seasons). The mIes and rates of exchange in the world are becoming fluid and
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speeding up, whether we think in economic terms (the Euro, global capital) or along culturallines
(the identity ofthe nation state becoming irrlbricated with diapsoric and virtual communities).
Apredominant trope for thinking about these changes is globalization, but I am wary of this
rhetorical template because, like softwares that provide ready-made letters of recommendation, it
seems to produce a few immediately recognizable personae. One familiar take on globalization
comes trom the techno-utopie Hacker, reader ofCyberzines likeMondo 2000 and Wired. He (for
this is a young, single white male-dominated group) really believes that as more and more people
get ever cheaper, smaller, faster machines, we will witness the unleashing of a Dionysian cultural
wave, a frenzied rush ofvisionary libidinaI, entrepeneurial and political creativity. He maintains this
belief despite the fact that he works in the very high-tech industry that transforms access and
information into commodities and capital investments in a corporate-run market. A different take is
heard from the safely situated academic cultural critic, who reduces "globalization" to a euphemism
for capitalist imperialism, and equates economic hegemony with cultural homogeneization. When
the inquiry into human transformations is framed by the roles that technology and science play in
cultural change, using "globalization" as a byword is a11 the more like to elicit these polarized
responses. But ifwe want to think about a kind of species-wide emergence without the discourse
ofglobalization, then what theoretical tools should we use, and what sites rnight we visit on our
world tour?
Machinic Thinking / Thinking Machines
"There is no biosphere or noosphere, but everywhere the same Mechanosphere" (Deleuze-Guattari
69).
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A style of thought consistent with the emergence at work in the world could be called,
sampling freely from Deleuze-Guattari, machinic. An organizing or methodological principle for'
such thought is suggested by Deleuze: an "ethology" that investigates "the relations of speed and
slowness, of the capacities for affecting and being affected that characterize each thing." Objects of
study--organisms, minds, bodies, machines--are defined by their relational velocities and affective
capacities, as well as the manner in which they "select ... what moves it or is moved by it"
(Deleuze, 125). Things or systems are termed "assemblages" in order to foreground funetional
principles over phenomenological behavior. Thus the Deleuzian method shares with the materialist
account of emergence a machinic and systemic mode of description, a non-reductionist emphasis on
the interactions within a system as weIl as its capacities for interacting with other systems.
Ethology ultimately works on and through systems that are agglomerations, assemblages loosely
assembled. Keith AnseIl Pearson thus sees Deleuzian ethology referrlng to "the synthesis of
heterogeneities," that is, "the demonstration ofhow the most varied components ... are able to
crystallize in assemblages that do not respect the distinctions between orders" (pearson, 190-191).
The power ofethology as a theoretical tool is that it can do work in many fields; the danger is that
its academic usage often lapses into a parrotting/parodying ofDeleuzelDeleuze-Guattari rhetorical
indulgences. Thus no talk here ofthe "Body without Organs," undsaweiter.
An ethology of"emergence" interested in a possible cultural transformation could take the
"mind" as its first assemblage to study, since mind in a wide sense would seem a necessary
component in any metamorphosis ofthe human. The boundaries ofwhat constitutes mind are in
question: what defines "intelligence"? what differentiates human intelligence trom machinie or
(other) animal intelligences? how do we define and distinguish mind and brain?
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So, what are the relational velocities and affective capacities ofthe mind? And what are
some ofthe "heterogeneous syntheses" in which it is involved? A compelling way to consider such
questions is provided by evolutionary psychologist Merlin Donald, who, in his book The Origins 0/
the Modern Mind outlines a "cognitive ethology ofhuman culture." For Donald, "cognitive
arehitecture" does not mean human brains, but involves the interplay ofminds and cultural
representational systems; his theory is marked by "its incorporation ofbiological and technological
faetors into a single evolutionary spectrum." Donald's essential contention is that "We act in
eognitive coUeetivities, in symbiosis with external memory systems. As we develop new external
symbolic eonfigurations and modalities, we reeonfigure our own mental arehiteeture in nontrivial
ways" (Donald, 382). Or, Brian Rotman sueeinctly summarizes Donald's idea: "the ways we
technologize our environment . . . beeome the ehannels by whieh we install bodily regimes and re-
eonfigure, i.e., rewire, our brain; establishing mappings between our neuro-physiology -- the insides
ofour heads -- and the technologieal milieu ... in whieh those heads operate" (Rotman, 6).
Donald's book probes the "origins" ofthe mind, but ofinterest here is bis idea that two
major cultural transitions brought about by ehanges in human biologieal hardware were followed by
a third ushered in through technologieal hardware. This third transition--dating trom the
development ofwriting about 6,000 years ago and the phonetic alphabet around 4,000 years ago--
oecurs through "graphie invention, external memory, and theory constmction" (Donald, 272). In
essenee, cognitive architeeture erosses over a recursive fold: the speedier, more flexible internal
biologieal memory that arose trom the first transitions then enabled the mind to project and extend
into external teehnologieal memory systems like writing and scientifie theory. And ever sinee,
Donald argues, "the growth ofthe external memory system has so far outpaeed biologieal memory
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that it is no exaggeration to say that we are permanently wedded to our great invention, in a
cognitive syrnbiosis unique in nature" (Donald, 356). Donald's metaphor of"syrnbiosis" merits
marking here, for syrnbiosis entails a fluid exchange between entities to the point of a breakdown of
boundaries between them and the--surely you saw it coming--emergence of something else. In
evolution, for instance, bacterial syrnbiosis generated new genes; in contemporary technoscience,
biotechnologically induced symbiosis produces new molecules and machines. Ifwe consider the
human mind in terms ofa "cognitive syrnbiosis" with external memory systems, then what new
assemblages do we see emerging? What new minds are evolving? Is Bayerisher Rundfunk' s Space
Night not already some mutant form oftechno-ecological awareness with a ghostly digital satellite
I1eye in the sky and the earth for a body? Suddenly, de Rosnay's scenario of a planetary network
brain begins to sound at least a little less like the donnee of a science-fiction screenplay.
Mind as Mimetic Morphing Memory
A necessary contributing factor to the notion of"cognitive syrnbiosis" between human
minds and external memory systems is a change in the predominant idea ofthe mind/brain itself In
essence, we find in cognitive science, neurology, and philosophy ofmind a trend toward a
materialist emergent position: the "mind"--consciousness, memory, a sense of personal identity--is
increasingly seen as an emergent property of processes that range from atomic and molecular
behavior to the transmission of nerve impulses through neurons. The brain, in other words,
becomes an assemblage, whose capacity for emergence is predicated precisely on its relational
velocity and the capacity for its components to affect and be affected by others.
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How are these characteristics measured? Most books about the brain begin by calling it
"the most complex object in the universe," because oftlle unimaginable speed and number of
signals being sent simultaneously. The cerebral cortex alone has around ten billion neurons that are
interconnected by about 100 million billion synaptic connections. Speed and capacity for being
affected are more than astronomical: Ifyou could count one connection per second, it would take
32 million years; if you stuck a match in someone's brain and counted the connections on the head-
-the match's head, that is--you'd find about a billion ofthem (Edelman, 6).
Neurologist Gerald Edelman provides a machinic description ofthe brain that accounts for
the emergence ofthought under the name of "neural Darwinism." In Edelman's account, the
genetic program ofDNA provides groundrules for the division and interconnections of a relatively
undifferentiated mass of trillions of ceIls, and how neural pathways and groups then begin to fonn
as the organism interacts with the environment; these connections get strengthened by repetition.
Deploying neuronal groups -- brain cell clusters randomly wired together, each in a different way--
the brain uses a kind of selection process to mold itselfto the contours ofthe outside world. When
an unfamiliar stimulus enters the brain through the senses, many groups of neurons respond, but
some happen to be configured in a way that makes them respond more strongly than the others,
because they fit the stimulus better. This resonance between signal and circuit sets off a
biochemical reaction which strengthens the synaptic links between neurons. Consequently, this
group of neurons will react to the stimulus more strongly in the future.
The key "emergentist" element ofEdelman's theory is that this process underlies the
dynamics ofthe brain across severallevels: different neuronal groups and topographical regions of
the brain are linked up in recursive loops of connections; these connections are "mappings" that
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enable systemic properties to evolve Ollt of the interacting groups and regions. These neural
configurations and behaviors are how the brain' s recursive dynamies generates new categorical
capabilities or modes ofthought. This mode oflearning is a fonn of "memory," since it functions
through 'recognition.' Edelman defines memory as "a system property": in bare, functional terms,
memory means that "previous changes alter successive changes in specified and special ways" (29).
This system property functions on severallevels, from hereditary memory at the genetic level or the
'memory' ofantibodies on the level ofthe immune system. The brain is therefore adynamie
assemblage, always engaged in what Edelman terms "recursive synthesis," a kind ofceaseless
selection process where impressions, thoughts and ideas emerge out ofthe tangled play ofbottom-
up interactions.
I must confess that I became interested in all this partly because the machinie language of
the brain is simply magnificent, and the accompanying diagrams always compelling: "thought" is
propogated from one cell to another by nerve impulses received through synaptic contacts on
dendritic trees; neurotransmitters send these signals hurtling across synaptic clefts on their way
through axons to the axonal trees; and oh, by the way, "the vesicles are floating in the bouton"
(Scott, 67). Is it any wonder that Deleuzians celebrate "the rhizomatic plasiticity ofneuronal
development" (cite)? The brain-assemblage is quite, weil, rhizomatic, or reticular, ifyou are
particular--the brain functions by retiulation, it fOrIns up into networks.
Now back to the larger point, in case you can't see the forest for a1l these trillions oftrees.
The idea at hand is that a symbiosis between human biological wetware and technological hardware
becomes imaginable when, let us say, human memory becomes "a system property" that can be
given a functional description and thus links up easily to "extemal memory systems." The human
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cerebral assemblage, in other words, appears as a sort ofcommunication network itself This
marks a shift from a traditional cognitive science and early artificial intelligence paradigm where the
brain was metaphorically understood as manipulator of symbols, a processor of information. Now,
the brain is a network wherein "symbols" and "meaning" correspond to global properties of local
interactions and connections. Once the brain is conceived of as a communications network in
itsel±: it becomes precisely the type of assemblage that would encourage us--or de Rosnay at least--
to entertain the idea ofthe brain as anode in a world wide web brain-network. De Rosnay,
extrapolating a model he draws from Jean-Pierre Changeux' s book Neuronal Man, unfolds the
analogy this way:
Placed in a nurturing environment, neurons in a culture divide themselves, forming
extensions and filaments which permit them to be connected with one another....
The entire history of communication on earth expresses itself along similar lines: the
formation ofnetworks, physical or immaterial, by direct contact, through chemical
signals, the circulation of electrons, of sounds or images; between molecules in cells,
between cells in the organism, between individuals in animal or human societies. (de
Rosnay, 11-12; my translation).
The chief enabling feature of the cerebral asserrlblage that this scenario presumes is the
suppleness a materialist emergentist account attributes to human minds and memory. In this avatar
ofphilosophy ofmind, human brains are defined not by a capacity for language or analytic or
imaginative thought, but by a flexibility in internal organization and morphology, an adaptive
openness to new linkages with the outside. The cerebral asserrlblage as "recursive synthesis of
heterogeneities." When this description of the brain is linked back to Donald' s thesis, the
provocative implication is that the inside of our heads are increasingly susceptible to being rewired
by using and learning from external memory systems. Ifthis is so, then as we become more and
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more logged onto or jacked into these external memory systems, won't the speed ofexternal
memory machines then speed up the process of rewiring the human brain? And ifmemory is indeed
understood not as an interna! psychological function but as a system property of the brain, then
won't the human-machine relation evolve to the point where we live amid a sense ofprosthetic
memory? Is memory the way we will morph in the 21st century?
It is but a short step from these kinds of questions to fantasies ofa total symbiosis between
humans and machines where human memory runs on technological hardware. This is the dream of
what Hans Moravec calls "digital immortality," astate achieved by downloading one's mind into a·
computer and thereby living forever (see Moravec 1988). Ofcourse, this idea presumes that
identity is a virtual or emergent aspect of the biological human, a dimension that can be encoded
and therefore transferred to a different machine--one not so susceptible to rotting as tlesh. Another
machinic projection ofthe selftoward extended life is the increasingly popular practice of cryonics:
the moment you die--or as soon afterwards as possible--you are frozen and stored someplace, until
such time and place that some machinery will thaw you into a new life form. Other sites could be
enumerated, but clearly, a human symbiosis with "extemal memory systems" is beginning to assume
new meanings.
(Question: cryonics offers the options ofhaving your whole body frozen or just your head. So,
which would you choose? A true litmus test ofpersonality.)
WERBUNG--A Two-Minute Spot for TV
But now let' sieave this Httle shop of technoscientific horrors in order to consider briefly the
implications ofthis cognitive ethology in the more immediate cultural context. What do we do with
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the idea that human memory seems ever more able to reconfigure itself and is more and more
densely linked to external memory systems, when the dominant "external memory system" today is
not the WWW or the pe but the TV, that machine of collective amnesia? It's a tired rift: I know,
but on TV collective cultural memory is reduced to and transformed into a storehouse of images
that can be recombined in any way called for by the context of consumption. Jameson cogently
diagnosed this process as a "loss of historicity" brought on by postmodern techniques such as
collage and pastiche, and media critics like Neil Postman have done detailed work on how this
process plays out in specific contexts.
But more is involved here than a forgetting or vacuity, a loss of some genuine history in a
flurry ofimagistica11y induced temporal and cognitive confusion. Now we see something like the
virtual synthesis of history and personal as well as cultural memory: as the consumer media train
our perceptual apparatuses, as the speed of image-flow entrains our capacity to be affected,
external media memory becomes injected into OUT own personal sense ofmemory, and we feel it as
it were OUT own. This rather overly-Baudrillardian sounding vision can be grounded in a simple
example: the fact that many ads are designed to induce in the viewer a nostalgia for something they
have never experienced except as image--such as the American TV ads aimed at the 17-25 year
olds that splice together images ofBeat writers like Kerouac or feature William Burroughs. Such
viewers feel an intense connection with a literary/cultural rebellion, even though they live it only by
vicarious consumption. These ads create what cultural anthropologist Atjun Appadurai calls an
"imagined nostalgia"--a simulated desire fOT something that feels as if it were experienced and lost,
when it is actually only created as an ephemeral illusion to induce a fleeting longing or fondness. In
effect, this imagined nostalgia redistributes the attractors ofour emotions and memories, ultimately
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reconfiguring the internal sense people have of their lives in subtle ways, and altering the links they
feel to preceding generations.
In this type of consumption-based repetition of the past, then, much more is at play than a
merely passive absorbtion ofrecycled images. Creating various images ofthe past also
reconstitutes the very concept ofthe past or history or time. As Appadurai writes, consumer media
repetition of images "is not based simply on the functioning of simulacra in time, but also on the
simulacra of time. That is, consumption not only creates time, through its periodicities, but the
workings of ersatz nostalgia create the simulacra of periods that constitute the flow oftime,
conceived as lost, absent or distant" (78). In other words, consumer media reattune us to time
from the bottom-up: the rhythms oftheir presentation enact temporal patterns and cultural histories
that we intemalize on many levels. These media, tuning our neurons to neurotic speeds,
"naturalize" life in consumer culture--they are part of a larger set of information flows that make up
the rhythms of life at the turn of the millenium.
Complexity Goes Global
This line ofthought would feed nicely into a neo-Heideggerian critique oftechnology
predicated on a distinction between an existential time into which we are thrown and a
technological time that sort of artificially inseminates itself into our lives. But the limitation of this
line on technology is that--in its American avatars at least--it posits a mimetic model where life
imitates technology. This not only runs the risk ofgranting technology some kind ofgiven status
and autonomous agency--but it is also all too soon a reductive and--if I may say so--simply boring
way to conceptualize technology in the first place. Both the seductive promise and real danger
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posed by technologies today grow out ofwhat we might call the productivity of machines.
Technologies do not only compute answers to prescribed problems or impose attitudes on us from
some ideological command center; technology has become a means ofexperimentation, of
assembling new assemblages, of synthesizing emergence in virtual forms. We are approaching a
point where, to the degree that technologies and machines become more 'vital,' humans become
increasingly peripheral.
This transformation in the machinic domain is viscera1ly visible in the contemporary
"sciences of complexity" and related practices such as "artificiallife." What began in chaos theory
with running simulations to describe the behavior of complex nonlinear systems has crossed a
threshold and become the writing ofalgorithms that persist as information strings in a
computational ecosystem. As Artificial Life guru Chris Langton puts it, "A different approach to
the study ofnonlinear systems involves the inverse of analysis: synthesis. Rather than start with the
behavior of interest and attempt to analyze it into its constituent parts, we start with the constituent
parts and put them together in the attempt to synthesize the behavior of interest" (Langton 1989:
41). In the sciences ofcomplexity, the "behavior of interest" is "complexity" itself Complexity is
defined as an emergent systemic behavior that is orderly but flexible, that has a degree of stability at
the level of the whole but can accomodate and adapt to new local events. Complexity is thus said
to reside "at the edge of chaos": i.e., between the extremes of order and chaos. In an "ordered
regime" or configuration, a system' s components evolve into a fixed configuration that is closed to
new input, while in a chaotic regime any small perturbation sets off cascades of effects. Order
means frozen intransigence; chaos means constant turmoil. Complexity means discernible structure
and supple order. Scientists do not analyze complexity but get it to emerge in networks by
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tweaking and tuning the algorithms and mIes that govern the interactions ofcomponents interact.
In networks that display complexity, the computer ecosystem falls onto attractors, regions or
patterns ofrelative stability. What these attractors mean depends on the field of"application": in
ecology, attractors could represent foodwebs; in theoretical biology, they might signify
morphogenesis; in sociobiology, insect colonies, and so on.
The wider cultural significance of the sciences of complexity though lies in the ways in
which scientific theories are "applied" to a range ofproblems in areas such as economics and
globalization. In an interesting recursive interplay, humans synthesize emergent behaviors in
computer ecosystems, and then extrapolate from them the solutions to knotty problems in the
world around them. In this vein I would like to discuss the work of Stuart Kauffinan, a charismatic
figure in complexity science and original member ofthe Santa Fe Institute. The SFI functions as a
think tank/research facility where experts from many different fields gather to adduce a common
theoretical framework for studying complex systems. In recent years, the Institute has diversified,
one might say, and branched out into corporation consulting. Kauffinan's field is theoretical
biology; in 1993, he published a widely read and praised technical book, The Origins ofOrder;
followed two years later by a popularized version ofbis ideas in At Home in the Universe: The
Search for the Laws ofSelf-Organization and Complexity. Within an ethology ofemergence in the
context ofglobalization, At Home in the Universe is an important text, for it teIls a compelling
story ofemergence as a machinic property of life, while also deploying synthesized models of
emergence as templates for strategies and policies ofglobalization.
As even a quick look through At Home in the Universe shows, its governing trope is
capital. Kauffinan's language purposively depicts ecological, economic and planetary problems and
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processes as isomorphie systems of exchange: "We are all trading our stuffto one another. We all
must make our living. Might generallaws govern all this activity?" (Kauffinan 1995: 16).
Kauffinan searches for such generallaws by using networks based on Boolean logic to create
"computational ecosystems" that simulate "fitness landscapes," model environments that provide
insight into "niehe creation and combinatorial optimization" (Kauffinan 1995: 282). Kauffinan's
work seemingly revises the Darwinian/Spencerian image of socio-economic relations with a
strikingly beneficient rhetoric: the ecology as a system of economic exchange is seen not in terms of
competition, mutual destruction and consumption, but as a system where "self-organization arises
naturally," spontaneously creating orderly patterns that maximize efficiency in the system.
Kauffinan's trademark phrase for this scenario is "order for free," a credo whose metaphoric
registers include economies, energy and politics.
One could say that At Home in the Universe is itself an assemblage that synthesizes these
heterogeneous domains into a rhetorical network. Thus emergence in computational ecosystems
provides a political-economic blueprint for globalization: Kauffinan proclaims that "the edge of
chaos may even provide a deep new understanding ofthe logic of democracy": indeed, "democracy
may be far and away the best process to solve the complex problems ofa complex evolving society,
to find the peaks on the coevolutionary landscape where, on average, all have a chance to prosper"
(Kauffinan 1995: 28). The idea is problematic on many accounts--ifKauffinan bases a politcal
preference for democracy on the basis of economic prosperity, then how would the success of
Indonesia fit into his model? Moreover, democracy as "far and away the best process" for finding
maximal economic efficiency turns less democratic at times--a somewhat Spencerian-sounding virus
infects Kauffinan's rhetorical software in the chapter "In Search ofExcellence," where his fitness
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landscape simulations uphold a 'survival ofthe fittest' ethos. The technical inference from the
model is that "In conflict-Iaden problems, the best solutions may be found it: in some way, different
subsets ofthe constraint are ignored at different moments" (1995: 269); when translated into
specific economic practices through SFI's corporate consulting, the scientific model's
demonstration that "the best solutions" involve ignoring "different subsets ofthe constraint"
essentially justifies massive corporate downsizing. This synthesis of neutral machinic description
and real world analogues is Kauffinan's rhetorical trademark: describing the behavior ofhis virtual
systems, Kauffinan says "Diversity begets diversity, driving the growth ofcomplexity. Such ideas
mighteventually have policy implications. If diversity matters, then helping Third World countries
might be better accomplished by fostering cottage industries that create a local web that is mutually
reinforcing and can take root and grow, rather than creating the Aswan Dam" (1995: 297).
Here it seems apt to interject Rob Wilson and Wimal Dissanayake's injunction that "in this
era ofuneven globalization and the two-tier information highway, [many discourses] can sound like
a way ofmaking the world safe and user-mendly for global capital and the culture ofthe
commodity form" (Wilson and Dissanayake 1996: 2). Certainly, Kauffinan's gushingly enthusiastic
extrapolations could be made with a more prescient eye to the consequences of the flows of capital
that his simulations would entail. The hope that First World capital would nurture cottage
industries in the Third World sounds rather naive; the primary form of transaction has come
through the multi-national corporation' sexpansion into new sites ofproduction that cut costs while
opening new markets: "Transnationalization of corporate identity ... implies a process ofglobal
localization: crossing borders and segmenting rnarkets via flexible production" (Wilson and
Dissanayake 1996: 5). Perhaps the biological model that best describes the economic relations
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between "developed" and "developing" nations is not Kauffman's "order for free" but Whitehead's
pithy rift: "life is robbery" (Whitehead 1978: 105).
Complexity Science: The Journey Horne
This critique ofKauffman's take on globalization, however, only engages a srnall part ofthe
story told inAt Home in the Universe. For Kauffman, the stakes are even bigger than
globalization: he sees complexity science as "a new way to think about origins, evolution, and the
profound naturalness oflife and its myriad patterns ofunfolding"; "... through this new science,"
Kauffman hopes, "we may recover our sense ofworth, our sense ofthe sacred" (Kauffman, 4-5).
Thus from the outset Kauffman forges a link between the cutting edge techno-virtual and the
spiritual-archaic. He relates how he learned the importance ofrecovering the sacred from Native
American author N. Scott Momaday, and frames the narrative with meditations on the Santa Fe
Institute's surroundings. After describing the New Mexico landscape outside bis window, "horne
ofthe oldest civilization in North America," Kauffman recounts a conversation with Gunter
Mahler--a theoretical physicist from Munich--where the two scientists agree that this terrain
provides a fitting image ofEden. Perhaps, Kauffman and Mahler speculate, this spiritual resonance
sterns from the resemblance ofthe New Mexico plains to East Africa, where the earliest human
remains have been found. They thus infer that "we might conceivably carry some genetic memory
of our birthplace, our real Eden, our first horne." Kauffman' s narrative is, then, a voyage back to
this lost origin; and it is science that should restore us to our "horne in the universe," Kauffman teIls
us, because it was the rise ofmodem science that deprived us of our faith: Kauffman' s aphorism
18
"Paradise was lost not to sin, but to science" could serve as the epigraph for the film version of the
book, "Cornplexity Science: the Joumey Horne."
This phrase flashed into my mind when I was looking at the \cover ofAt Home in the
Universe, which plays off of and into several registers of cinematic and science-fiction association.
The jacket's background is a color image ofthe universe generated by the National Air and Space
Museum. Placed next to the bold, white capitalletters ofthe title "AT HOME IN THE
UNIVERSE" is a computer-generated image of a footprint; a red dashed line links the footprint
inset to a yellow-circled spot in an image ofthe earth generated by NASA; another red dashed line
connects the earth inset to a yellow circle that presumably designates the earth's location in the
universe. There is a kind of stunning, cosmic anthropomorphism at work here: like a spruced up
rendering of the T-shirts that have an image of the universe on the front with an arrow pointing to
an encircled dot that bears the legend "you are here," the book's cover in essence makes the
footprint, signifier ofhuman origins, the most significant point in the universe. The Copernican
revolution that decentered hurnans and the earth from their privileged place in the universe is met
by a counterrevolution: one small footprint ofman, one big footstep for mankind. While the words
"The search" next to a circle around a small planet in the universe usually refer to a search for alien
intelligence, here, the adventure is a search for scientific "laws" that describe OUf integral place in
the universe; the cosmic time-travel signalied by a search for alien life on a distant planet becomes
an anthropological-evolutionary time-travel back to our origins. "What a long strange trip it's
been."
We cannot judge this book by its cover, of course, since it discloses a substantial and
specific scientific narrative. Kauffinan' s central idea is that evolution is driven not only by natural
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selection and random variation or chance mutation, but also by self-organization. This marks a
major revision ofthe Darwinian narrative ofhuman origins, especially in its contemporary
expression through molecular biology--Jacques Monod's famous aphorism being that evolution
through natural selection was "chance caught on the wing." It: by contrast, the "laws of self-
organization" play a central role in the origins of life, then the human species does not appear as
just another "tinkered together contraption" of evolution, but the inevitable target ofnatural
selection. Kauffinan argues that the intricately ordered features ofontogeny in particular are hard
to accou.nt for in terms of selection alone; he maintains that these features anse from the self-
organized behavior of complex genetic regulatory systems, and self-organization is so integral a
part ofthis behavior that "selection cannot avoid that order" (1993: xvii). Thus Kauffinan's
evolutionary credo: "Not we the accidental, but we the expected" (8)--spiritual succor for a lost
species.
The question Kauffinan must answer is, why would complexity or self-organization be a
natural target ofnatural selection? Recapping the whole concept of"complexity as life at the edge
of chaos," cornplex systems would be selected by natural selection because oftheir ability to
maintain and replicate themselves in the face of perturbations from the environment. And what
explains this ability? Self-organization. And what is the motive drive in self-organization--or, what
is the "self' of self-organization? It is a parallel-processing internal structure that enables a system
to "perforrn extrernely complex cornputations" that allow for "more complicated dynamics
involving the complex coordination ofactivities throughout a network" (Kauffinan 1982, 82).
Thus in a sense the information processing capability embodied by the dynamics of the network
signifies the evolutionary fitness and stability ofthe natural entity. The targer irnplication is
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succinctly summarized by Chris Langton: "the edge of chaos is where information gets its foot in
the door in the physical world, where it gets the upper hand over energy" (Lewin 51).
Now, there seems to be a weird form of circularity at work here. In our narrative, we see a
new form ofmachinic assemblage, the computer simulation, synthesizing emergenee as a virtual
behavior. In Kauffman' s narrative, the maehinic properties that enable this to oeeur, "eomplex
computations," is read back into the evolutionary tale oforigins. Or, more grandly put,
teehnoseienee at the end ofthe 20th century generates new graphie inventions housed in external
memory maehine that have the power of suggestion to make us reeall how humans eame to oeeupy
an inevitable, and therefore sacred horne on earth and in the universe. Evolutionary narratives are
always inseribed in this kind of strange temporalloop, in that they retroaetively eonstruct a theory
ofhow things 'evolved' into the state that they are now. But in Kauffman's narrative, where
Boolean nets and computer simulations play a eentral performative or demonstrative role, it is as if
the "extemal memory systems" remember how it is that humans eame to be. Or, in Rieh Doyle puts
it, "who or what would have expected us, exeept a simulacrum?"
A Re-emergence of Imagination
The ethologist turns away now from seientific narratives of emergenee, and, nostalgie for the Lit
Crit persona he has long sinee abandoned, looks around for alternative narratives, more ereative
morphologies ofemergenee. But the seareh is eonstrained by the Cultural Critie's stern
admonishment that the lit game is played differently when the field expands and ineludes
globalization. How can any ereative, soeially meaningful assemblages emerge in the teehno-virtual
domain? A theoretieal answer may be formulated by liroong Donald's thesis that humans aet, think
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and evolve in "cognitive collectivities in symbiosis with external memory systems" to Atjun
Appadurai's take on globalization. Appadurai argues that the primary driving forces in
globalization are widespread electronic mediation and mass migrations. Both ofthese forces, he
argues, open up a revitalized function for a redefined idea ofwhat he terms "the work ofthe
imagination." Emergent diasporic cultural formations must invent themselves anew, combining
disparate circumstances and traditions into new fultural forms. Electronic mediation provides some
ofthe means by which such work is carried out.
From the ethologist's standpoint, Appadurai gives a machinic account of imagination as a
form of emergence. More precisely, we could say that Appadurai gives a materialist account ofthe
work ofthe imagination. Imagination, he says, is not an individual faculty; it is also not simply a
mode ofcontemplation, fantasy or escape. In its properly collective sense, Appadurai theorizes
imagination as "an organized field ofsocial practices, a form ofwork (in the sense ofboth labor
and culturally organized practice), and a form ofnegotiation between sites ofagency (individuals)
and globally defined fields ofpossibility.... The imagination is now central to all forms ofagency, is
itself a social fact, and is the key component ofthe new global order" (3 1). Translating collective
imagination into a model ofmachinic emergence, we would say--this work occurs as several
dispersed people begin to exchange words, forging connections that build in number and speed;
soon, the justification or idea ofwhy they are doing so ernerges as a collective identity--a process
comparable to what Benedict Anderson saw in "imagined communities." The emergent collective
sense ofwhat is being worked for or on is what then sustains the community's development.
Such an account frequently is met by the critique that collective work as carried out in
virtual networks constitutes a flattening or loss ofagency. In terms that reiterate Donald's notion
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of"cognitive symbiosis," Judy Purdom acknowledges that "the pe revolution has brought
communication between man and machine to a new complexity," to the point of"a real symbiosis
between man and machine." But for Purdom, this symbiosis can be thought only as "the move
towards a generalized regime of subjection which actually dissolves the notion ofthe individual as a
distinctive agent; it make man an agent of irmumanization and the socius of a machinic
production..." (124). Mediation thus produces a reduction of cultural differences, a cultural
entropy that precludes emergence. Appadurai resists this idea: "there is growing evidence," he
says, "that consumption ofmass media throughout the world often provokes resistance, irony,
selectivity and in general, agency" (7). As migration and mediation break down traditional
boundaries, the cultural sphere becomes increasingly dynamic; Appadurai, while cognizant ofthe
risks involved, asserts that this loss oftraditional ground simultaneously makes it possible to rethink
the "cultural," to move it from spheres ofkinship or ethnicity into a permeable and changing space,
a constantly shifting emergent work actively produced through imagination.
Sieepiess in Seattle
I will end simply by invoking some work ofcol1ective imagination that is explicitly informed
by a view that culture is something to be made, and that new media enable certain forms of such
production to assume new morphologies. I am speaking of a writing collective called
IN.S.OMNIA that originated in the Seattle area in 1983 as an electronic bulletin board where
people carried on different "conversations" taking place in ttrooms. tt Ever since, Insomniacs--so
named because they lose sleep to their work--have continued to investigate the potential ofnew
media to reappropriate the work of culture. In Invisible Rendezvous: Connection anti
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Collaboration in the New Landscape 0/Electronic Writing, a published manifesto oftheir work
and ideas, IN.S.OMNIA announces that rather than "look[ing] for 'the next big thing' in literature, "
we should realize that perhaps "the next big thing already surrounds us, embedded in small gestures
we perform every day[.] What if the next big thing is the realization that we have changed the way
we use culture--remapping, rewiring, renetworking the same old pool of elements in new ways,
adding to them furtive scribbles, seeking pleasures without naming them?" (8). Insomniacs thus
think along the lines of Appadurai's definition ofthe work ofimagination as a social practice and
definition ofthe cultural as an ongoing project.
It is not a genre or type ofwriting Insomniacs are after, but "WRITING THAT DOES
NOT KNOW WHAT IT IS." Thus Insomnia seeks something more like a narrative mode or habit
of mind, one that "requires cunning, speed, and multilevelled thirllcing. Sophisticated techniques of
irony, punning, and collage are used for their efficiency. Quick acts of selection and linkage are the
name ofthe game" (6). IN.S.OMNIAc practices include using canonical classics to create hybrid
texts, such as "Miss Scarlett's Letter," a crossbreeding ofHawthome's Puritan New England with
Margaret Mitchell's antebellum South. They invent practices that comprise scripted analogues to
digital sampling or improvisational rapping: imagine, they say, literary cover versions of classics--
Mailer' s Moby Dick or Ashberry' s Don Juan--and insomniac Strange Justice asks, "'Wouldn't you
love to see The Waste Land remixed?" (89). (Of course, pound for pound, the "original" was
already one ofthe better remixes in the history of the canon.)
The most sustained work ofimagination undertaken by IN.S.OMNIA involved a project
begun in the early 80's called Invisible Seattle. The idea was to create neither a "world apart" nor
"a retlection or imitation" but an "alternate use" of something already persisting, "with which it
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coexists and which it interpenetrates" (118). Examining the urban space, the "invisibles"--as they
deemed themselves-~asked, "'Who describes America now?'" --the developers, merchants,
politicians, who mainly erase reality to erect a profitable substitute. At first, Invisible Seattle was a
small group collaboration, a fictional reappropriation ofthe ostensibly 'real' Seattle, an imaginative
act ofrevenge for all the subdivisions that get named for the geographical features they destroy.
They drew up a map ofInvisible Seattle, where Seattle landmarks are recast: the Kingdome
becomes the Coliseum ofRome, dubbed the Dome ofKings; an office tower morphs into
Breughel's Tower ofBabel, which the legend names Bibioteca Jorge Borges; the Space Needle is
restored to its quoted source, the Eiffel Tower. And Invisible Seattle can best be seen by riding the
monorail, renamed "The Disorient Express. "
But then the project, weIl, emerged--Iocal connections and contingent events began to add
up, until the project exfoliated into a more fully blown social event. The ra1lying cry became
"Function Follows Fiction," meaning that the use of the tanglible city could be reclaimed by being
reimagined and rewritten by its inhabitants, and the ultimate goal became to "tickle a city into
writing a novel about itself" Literary workers in hardhats took to the streets, and flyers went up
around the city inviting people to record events at specific locations, to rename buildings, to
develop "three zones ofINVISffiLE SEATTLE: the Ignored, the Imperceptible, and the
Impossible" (35). To feed popular interest and play into the ludic, participatory spirit ofthe
project, the Invisibles invented new writing tools. Sculptor Clair Colquitt assembled the "first ofa
new generation ofliterary computers," the Scheherezade 11, later followed by the Insomnium, a
writing station done in video game fonnat·providing "a genre ofliterary engagement limited only by
time and spare change" (100). This all eventuated in the Invisible Seattle Novel Project being
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installed in the city museum, where Seattle mayor Charles Royer stepped through Scheherezade 11
and "threw out the opening word," and for four days thousands of people came and read, wrote
and edited a growing text. Finally, in 1987, the novel Invisible Seattle was published.
Mutant Professors
One can easily level any number of objections and critiques against this breezy pieture of Insomnia
and an optimistic trust in the work of collective imagination. The simple fact alone that the vast
majority of conversation on the Internet shows absolutely no imagination precludes that Insomnia
poses any kind of"solution" to the "problems" that such work must overcome. But the beauty of
Insomnia's work lies precisely in its tenuous, local quality--the contingency of one project' s success
being confirmed by all the failed ventures and lame texts produced in the meantime. From within
the safe and sage confines of academia, it is easier to sit back and watch the nasty tentacles of
globalization spread than to jack into the dreck-filled information highway, more comforting to use
PC's to describe the evils oftechnology than to leam how to play with them. But academia as a
project, if it is survive in a sustainable form, must itself produce its proper forms of emergence.
Perhaps the Insomniacethos of ludic openness and lucid speed, textual excursions and ironie
incursions, could be mobilized in the service ofan intellectual commitment to collective works of
imagination. In spite ofour worst fears, culture cannot be homogeneized by machines as easily as
milk can. We are no longer the sacred cows we once were, but then, maybe we can have more fun
than we used to.
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